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The Structural Implications of
Inventors' Disclosure Obligations
Kevin Emerson Collins*
Disclosure theory posits that inventors must disclose knowledge about
their inventions and make that knowledge freely available for certain uses
during the term of a patent as part of the price that they pay for their exclusive
patent rights. This Article identifies an overlooked implication of this
disclosure obligation. The availability of disclosed knowledge itself for free
public use during the term of a patent means that there must be limits on
inventors' rights: inventors must not be allowed to transform the use of
disclosed knowledge itself into infringement through strategic claiming. If
they could, inventors would, oddly, be able to opt out of their mandatory
disclosure obligations. To avoid this result, it is necessary to recognize the
structural implications of inventors' disclosure obligations: inventors'
exclusive rights must be doctrinally restricted so that inventors cannot
privatize through their claims the very uses of disclosed knowledge that they
are obligated to publicize through their disclosures. This implication of
inventors' disclosure obligations has to date been overlooked because it
requires an analysis that examines the intersection of patent law's incentive
and disclosure theories, and these two theories have conventionally been
examined only in isolation.
In many situations that form the core of the public privilege to use
disclosed knowledge itself, contemporary patent law already limits patentees'
rights in the ways needed to protect the public privilege. In these situations,
recognizing the structural implications of inventors' disclosure obligations
would lead to a sorely needed bout of conceptual housekeeping, providing
doctrinal coherence that is today absent and thus long-term stability for
doctrines that today rest on shaky foundations. However, in other situations
that are at the periphery of the public privilege to use disclosed knowledge
itself, recognizing the structural implications of patentees' disclosure
obligations may influence debates over what restrictionspatent law ought to
impose on patentees' rights.
*

Professor of Law, Washington University
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INTRODUCTION

Patent law is commonly justified by two different theories,
either individually or in combination. On the one hand, the incentive
theory of patent law posits that patents create incentives for selfinterested individuals to produce socially beneficial innovation. Patent
claims grant inventors exclusive rights to their claimed inventions for
a limited period of time, with the hope of profit tomorrow from those
exclusive rights leading individuals to invest in innovation today. On
the other hand, disclosure theory posits that patents create social
benefits by forcing inventors to disclose knowledge about their
inventions and granting the public a privilege to freely use that
knowledge in certain ways even before the expiration of the patent.1
From the moment patent disclosures are published, the public has a
privilege to freely engage in activities such as disseminating the
disclosed knowledge and employing the disclosed knowledge as an
input into the creative cognition that conceives yet further innovation,
including both improvements and design-arounds. For convenience,

1.
Disclosure theory in patent law is not unitary. Several distinct disclosure theories focus
on different mechanisms through which disclosures generate social benefits. See infra Part I. The
strain of disclosure theory on which this Article focuses is the pre-expiration public-knowledge
theory of the disclosure. See infra notes 15, 17, and accompanying text. This Article intentionally
uses the term "knowledge" in the way that patent-speak often uses the term "information." See
infra note 89.
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these pre-expiration uses of disclosed knowledge to which the public is
entitled will be called uses of disclosed knowledge itself.
Working at the intersection of patent law's incentive and
disclosure theories, this Article brings to light the overlooked,
structural implications of inventors' obligations to disclose innovative
knowledge. The availability of the disclosed knowledge itself for free
public use during the term of a patent under disclosure theory means
that there must be limits on the exclusive rights granted to inventors
under incentive theory. For an as-of-right public privilege to the use of
disclosed knowledge itself to coexist with inventors' exclusive rights to
their claimed inventions, inventors must not be able to claim exclusive
rights to the use of disclosed knowledge itself. Imagine if patentees
could control the public's ability to disseminate the knowledge
disclosed in the specification-e.g., by claiming a document
representing certain knowledge as their invention-or perform thecognitive processes employing that knowledge to generate furtherinnovation-e.g., by claiming the act of understanding certain
knowledge as their invention. If the Patent Act were to grant such
exclusive rights to these uses of disclosed knowledge, inventors could,
bizarrely, opt out of their disclosure obligations through strategic
claiming. To avoid this result, it is necessary to recognize the
structural implications of inventors' disclosure obligations: patentees'
exclusive rights must be doctrinally restricted so that inventors
cannot privatize through their claims the very uses of disclosed
knowledge that they are obligated to publicize through their
2
disclosures.
The patent community's oversight of the structural
implications of inventors' disclosure obligations is surprising. Over the
last half century, the Supreme Court has repeatedly highlighted that
the public-knowledge theory of disclosure is an essential part of the
congressional design of the Patent Act, identifying the duality of
privatizing claims and publicizing disclosures as one of the most
important principles shaping the Act's deep structure. 3 Yet the idea
These implications are structural in the sense that structural interpretation reveals
2.
their statutory basis in the Patent Act. See infra notes 57-64 and accompanying text. Both the
statutory validity provisions that define the scope of a valid patent claim and the statutory
infringement provisions that define the content of patentees' exclusive rights with respect to
their claims influence patentees' exclusive rights, and both can be restricted to reflect the
structural implications of inventors' disclosure obligations. See infra notes 61-62 and
accompanying text.
3.
See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 216 (2003); J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer
Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001); Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998);
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51 (1989); Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974).
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that the provisions of the Patent Act establishing what can be
patented, as well as what rights patentees have with respect to
patented inventions, should be read in light of that structure does not
appear in the opinions, casebooks, and treatises that provide the
lexicon that undergirds our understanding of patent law. This gap in
how we understand patent law needs to be filled by considering the
intersection of disclosure and incentive theories, which are more
commonly considered either in isolation or in the alternative.
One reason this unexamined gap in disclosure theory has
stubbornly persisted can likely be traced to the fact that contemporary
patent law already limits patent owners' rights in the ways that are
needed to safeguard the core of the public privilege to use knowledge
itself prior to patent expiration. Through a doctrinal bricolage of sorts,
courts already provide de facto recognition of the structural
implications of inventors' disclosure obligations, but they do not
provide de dicto recognition of those implications in the reasoning that
they deploy to explain why the law is the way it is or what the law is
doing. 4 For example, the printed matter doctrine forbids claims to
texts representing newly created technological knowledge to human
readers that would interfere with the public privilege to disseminate
disclosed knowledge, without ever mentioning inventors' disclosure
obligations. 5 Similarly, the patent-ineligibility of mental processes
forbids many claims that might interfere with the public privilege to
employ the disclosed knowledge to generate further innovation in the
form of design-arounds or improvements, again without ever expressly
mentioning this goal. 6 In these situations, recognizing the structural
implications of inventors' disclosure obligations leads to a sorely
needed bout of conceptual housekeeping, providing doctrinal
coherence that is today absent and thus long-term stability for extant
doctrines that today rest on shaky foundations. It also reveals a single
analytical and policy thread that weaves its way through what is
today perceived as a set of disparate, unrelated aspects of patent law.
However, in other situations that are closer to the periphery of
the public privilege to use disclosed knowledge itself, recognizing the
structural implications of inventors' disclosure obligations may
influence debates over what restrictions patent law ought to impose on
patentees' rights. With respect to the dissemination of disclosed

4.
Cf. Kevin Emerson Collins, The Knowledge/Embodiment Dichotomy, 47 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1279, 1285-87 (2014) (arguing that contemporary patent law implements a
knowledge/embodiment dichotomy in a de facto sense but not a de dicto sense).
5.
See infra notes 63-67, 73-81, and accompanying text.
6.
See infra notes 124-128 and accompanying text.
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knowledge, should the making and selling of texts that are also
components of machines (including software and DNA molecules) 7 or8
instructional texts that are packaged with conventional technologies
be infringing activities? How about the dissemination of texts when
the disseminator intends to induce others to use the knowledge to
make, use, or sell patentable technological applications of the
disclosed knowledge? 9 The democratization, of three-dimensional
printing is a hotly debated, contemporary issue that raises more than
one of these questions: When should the dissemination of data files of
the three-dimensional shape of an inventive product be actionable,
infringing conduct? 10 With respect to a reader's right to understand
and think about disclosed knowledge, should human cognition
employing disclosed knowledge ever be an advance over the prior art
that gives rise to a patentable invention, or would the resulting claims
impinge on the public privilege to use disclosed knowledge itself?"
These questions touch on the proper reach of the structural
implications of inventors' disclosure obligations and demonstrate that
the scope of the public privilege to use disclosed knowledge itself is a
legitimately contestable issue. There are difficult policy debates to
flush out and hard line-drawing issues to be resolved.1 2 When working
at the periphery of the public privilege to use disclosed knowledge
itself, this Article frames the debates that the patent community
should be having and identifies costs and benefits of different
conceptions of the activities that make up the privilege.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I reviews the
multifaceted nature of disclosure theory in order to identify with
greater precision the pre-expiration, public-knowledge strain of
disclosure theory at issue in this Article. Part II introduces the
structural implications of inventors' disclosure obligations under this
strain of disclosure theory and identifies a statutory basis for limiting
patentees' rights so as to generate an as-of-right public privilege to use
disclosed knowledge itself before patent expiration. Part III addresses
different conceptions of the substance of this privilege and what limits
on patent rights might therefore be required to safeguard it.

7.
See infra Section 1II.A.1.
See infra Section III.A.2.
8.
9.
See infra Section III.A.3.
10. See infra notes 96-102, 118-119, and accompanying text.
11. See infra Section III.B.
12. In some instances, the state of contemporary patent law is also unclear, making it
difficult to know whether recognizing an activity as part of the public privilege to use disclosed
knowledge itself would require a change in patent law.
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I. DISCLOSURE THEORIES

The disclosure theory of patent law is often defined in part by
distinguishing it from the incentive theory of patent law. Under
incentive theory, the principal purpose of patent law is to provide
innovation incentives. 13 Absent patent rights, rational individuals will
not incur the sunk costs of innovation when those costs are significant
because they will not expect to recoup those costs in a competitive
market for the innovation that they produce. By granting innovators
exclusive rights to their claimed inventions, patents create an
expectation that successful innovators can internalize some fraction of
the social welfare that their innovations generate and, hopefully,
recoup their sunk costs. In contrast, disclosure theory focuses on the
flows of public knowledge that patents create. Section 112(a) of the
Patent Act requires that inventors disclose certain types of knowledge
14
about their inventions as a condition of receiving exclusive rights.
Disclosure theory justifies patent law on the basis of the social benefit
that this disclosed knowledge generates.
To speak more precisely about the social benefit of patent
disclosures-and, eventually, about the structural implications of
inventors' disclosure obligations-it is helpful to recognize that
disclosure theory is not unitary. Although patent scholarship routinely
uses the term "disclosure theory" in the singular, there is no single,
agreed-upon mechanism through which patent disclosures generate
social benefits. To the contrary, patent scholarship has identified
several distinct disclosure theories, each highlighting a conceptually
independent social benefit that flows from disclosure. The remainder
of this Part offers an original categorization that distinguishes four
strains of disclosure theory: a public-knowledge theory, a rightslimitation theory, a signal theory, and a broadcast theory of patent
disclosures.
First, the public-knowledge theory of the disclosure grounds
the social value of disclosures in the benefits of making technological
knowledge freely available to the public, including inventors'
competitors. 15 This benefit provided by publicly accessible knowledge

13.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND
COPYRIGHTS OF THE S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., 2D SESS., AN ECON. REVIEW OF THE
PATENT SYS. 21 (Comm. Print 1958) (prepared by Fritz Machlup) [hereinafter Machlup].

14. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
15. The scholarship addressing the public-knowledge theory of patent disclosures is
voluminous, and much of it focuses on the theory's weaknesses. See, e.g., Alan Devlin, The
Misunderstood Function of Disclosure in Patent Law, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401 (2010); Rebecca
S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progressof Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U.

2016]

STRUCTURAL IMPLICATIONS OF DISCLOSURE

1791

is different after and before patent expiration. After expiration,
disclosures allow the public to practice the claimed invention. But for
the presence of an enabling disclosure in the specification, inventors
could continue to enjoy de facto exclusivity after patent expiration if
they protect knowledge of how to make or use the claimed technology
as a trade secret. 16 Before expiration, disclosures stimulate others to
engage in the inventive activity even though they do not practice the
claimed invention. Competitors can access the disclosed knowledge,
comprehend it, and disseminate it; they can use it as an input into the
cognitive processes that lead to further innovation in the form of
17
design-arounds and improvements.
The public-knowledge theory of disclosure is implicit in the
Supreme Court's repeated description of patent law as a quid pro quo
or bargain in which inventors and the public exchange valuable rights.
The public, via the state, grants inventors rights to exclude
competitors from the claimed technology, and, in return, inventors
disclose knowledge to the public that they otherwise could have
attempted to protect as a trade secret.1 8 The quid pro quo narrative

CHI. L. REV. 1017 (1989); Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539 (2009); Lisa
Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 545 (2012);
Jason Rantanen, Patent Law's Disclosure Requirement, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 369 (2013); Jason
Rantanen, PeripheralDisclosure, 74 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (2012); Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching
Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 627 (2010); Katherine J. Strandburg, What
Does the Public Get?: Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain,2004 Wis. L. REV. 81, 101; Note,
The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (or Lack Thereof), 118 HARV. L. REV. 2007, 2028
(2005); cf. Dan L. Burk, The Role of Patent Law in Knowledge Codification, 23 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1009, 1012 (2008) (suggesting that "many familiar provisions of the patent statute may be
viewed as incentives for codification of otherwise tacit knowledge").
16. The post-expiration strain of public-knowledge disclosure theory has a long pedigree in
the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484
(1944); United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186-87 (1933); Grant v.
Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218, 247 (1832). In fact, it reaches back to England in the eighteenth
century. Edward C. Waltersheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law:
Antecedents (Part3), 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 771, 796-97 (1995) (discussing Liardet
v. Johnson, 1 Carp. P.C. 35 (K.B. 1778)).
17. The pre-expiration strain of public-knowledge disclosure theory was first overtly
discussed in patent scholarship in the middle of the twentieth century. Machlup, supra note 13,
at 25 n.135; John C. Stedman, Invention and PublicPolicy, 12 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 649, 666
(1947). Hints of the value of public knowledge prior to patent expiration reach back much
further. WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, 1 THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS 52 (Boston,

Little, Brown & Co. 1890) (noting that a patent "secures to the public an immediate knowledge of
the character and scope of the invention"). For more recent discussions, see infra notes 41-48
and accompanying text.
18. See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder
Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51 (1989); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,
484 (1974). The quid pro quo is often criticized as not giving the public sufficient benefit because
many patented inventions could not be both commercialized and kept secret in the absence of a
patent. Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 1028-30.
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highlights that disclosures are not in the self-interest of inventors.
They are a "price" that is "exacted from" patentees in return for
protection.19 They are positive externalities enjoyed by firms'
competitors that, all else being equal, the firms would like to forego. 20
In short, disclosures are beneficial to society, but costly to inventors.
Second, rights-limitation theory locates the public benefit of the
disclosure in the disclosure's instrumental role in shaping patent
claims. 2 1 Here, the end goal of the disclosure is not to provide
competitors with useful knowledge. Rather, disclosures are a means to
the end of appropriately sized claims. Patent examiners and judges
use disclosures to pare down permissible claim scope, limiting it so
that it remains proportional to the contribution to progress that an
inventor actually makes. 22 The enablement and written description
doctrines of § 112(a), 23 along with the rules of means-plus-function
claiming of § 112(f),24 are the primary doctrinal mechanisms through
which the disclosure limits claim scope. 25 The thread that runs
through all of these doctrines is that the disclosure is an instrument
that examiners and judges use to restrict the rights to which patent
owners are entitled. 26 Under rights-limitation theory, inventors have
19. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 216 (2003); see also THOMAS G. FESSENDEN, AN ESSAY
ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR NEW INVENTIONS 48-49 (1st ed. 1810) ("The specification is the
price which the patentee is to pay for his monopoly.").
20. Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247,
267 (1994); Suzanne Scotchmer & Jerry Green, Novelty and Disclosure in Patent Law, 21 RAND
J. ECON. 131, 132 (1990).
21. Insofar as disclosure theories are defined in juxtaposition to incentive theories that are
concerned with increasing suboptimal investment in invention and innovation, the rightslimitation theory is not a disclosure theory at all. It is rather a subtheory of innovation theory
addressing how to properly tailor patent incentives.
22. Scholarship addressing the rights-limitation theory of disclosure is also voluminous.
See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia, What Is the "Invention'?,53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1855 (2012);
Oskar Liivak, Rescuing the Invention from the Cult of the Claim, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1
(2012).
23. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012). Under enablement, the set of claimed technologies must
remain tethered to the set of technologies that the disclosure teaches a person of ordinary skill in
the art to make and use without undue experimentation. In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839
(C.C.P.A. 1970). Under written description, the claimed set must be commensurate with the set
of technologies for which the disclosure reveals important structural properties. Ariad Pharm.,
Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
24. In some ways, reiterating the rule of written description as part of the doctrine of claim
construction, means-plus-function claiming ensures that the scope of claims using functional
language is restricted to the disclosed structures and their equivalents. See 35 U.S.C. § 112()
(2012).
25. The use of the disclosure to shape claim scope through the process of claim construction
remains controversial. Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 653 F.3d 1296 (Fed.
Cir. 2011), reh'g en banc denied, 659 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
26. The disclosure plays another supporting role for patent claims as well: it helps to
clarify what claim terms mean. Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 322 U.S. 471,
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incentives to provide more robust disclosures in order to obtain
broader claims. However, disclosures remain a price that inventors
must pay in the sense that inventors still have incentives to minimize
the disclosure to the smallest possible quantum of knowledge that will
uphold the claims that they seek.
Third, the signal theory of disclosure posits that patent
disclosures generate a social benefit because they serve as a
mechanism for patent applicants to communicate information that
they want to communicate but that they cannot otherwise effectively
communicate. The Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") has
examined the disclosures in issued patents and deemed them
sufficient to support valid patent claims. 2 7 When the disclosed
knowledge has been stamped with this government seal of approval,
patent disclosures serve a signaling function. They provide a low-cost
means of sending credible signals to capital markets about the quality
28
of the research and development capabilities of the patenting firm.
Here, it is not the disclosed knowledge per se that provides a social
benefit. Rather, it is the government imprimatur that accompanies an
issued patent based on that knowledge that provides the benefit.
Unlike the public-knowledge and rights-limitation theories, signal
theory rejects the notion that disclosure is a price that is exacted from
patent applicants. Disclosure is instead an act that furthers patent
applicants' self-interest and, indirectly, benefits society.
Fourth, the broadcast theory of disclosure focuses on the
consensual, contractual exchanges of knowledge for valuable
consideration that are facilitated by patentees' exclusive rights.
Knowing that they have exclusive rights to the most straightforward,
commercial uses of their inventions, inventors can communicate or
broadcast knowledge about their research and development efforts to
potential rights purchasers without being concerned about
appropriation and use of the knowledge without payment. 29 In the
484 (1944) (describing disclosures as "essential to warn the industry concerned of the precise
scope of the monopoly asserted").
27. Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 625, 636 (2002).
28. Clarisa Long discusses two types of signals: patent counts, id. at 646, and the
information disclosed in patent specifications, id. at 647. Only the latter suggests that the patent
disclosure in particular serves a signaling function.
29. The pre-expiration variant of the public-knowledge theory of the disclosure focuses on
the social benefit of the noncontracting members of the public being able to engage in uses of the
disclosed knowledge that are not covered by patent claims. See supra note 17 and accompanying
text. In contrast, the broadcast theory of the disclosure focuses on the social benefit created when
members of the public can assess the private value of engaging in uses of the disclosed
knowledge that are covered by patent claims. This assessment is necessary for the public to
determine whether it wants to license or purchase a patent. See infra notes 30-31 and
accompanying text.
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context of bilateral negotiations, patents resolve Arrow's information
paradox. 30 Patent disclosures allow information possessors to
communicate that information to potential buyers without concern
that a potential buyer, who must know the information before
payment in order to determine whether he wants to buy it, will take
the information without payment. Scaling up the same idea to one-tomany communication, patent disclosures serve as a beacon of sorts,
allowing the parties who believe that they can put the patented
knowledge to productive commercial use to approach the patent owner
31
for a license.
11. THE STRUCTURAL IMPLICATIONS OF
PRE-EXPIRATION PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE

The structural implications of inventors' disclosure obligations
follow from one specific strain of disclosure theory-namely, the preexpiration variant of the public-knowledge theory. The fact that
patents make disclosed knowledge immediately available for certain
public uses before expiration-including inter alia comprehension,
dissemination, design-around, and improvement-necessitates that
patent owners not be able to draft claims that subject those uses to
private control. 32 That is, if the public privilege to use disclosed
knowledge in these ways is to be as-of-right, not permissive in the
sense that an inventor can opt out of it by strategically drafting claims
that turn the use of disclosed knowledge into an infringing activity,
30. Robert P. Merges, A Transactional View of Property Rights, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1477, 1489-90 (2005).
31. F. Scott Kieff, On Coordinating Transactions in Intellectual Property: A Response to
Smith's Delineating Entitlements in Information, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 101 (2007),
http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/on-coordinating-transactions-in-intellectual-property-a-responseto-smiths-delineating-entitlements-in-information
[https://perma.cc/98QH-J8AS];
Roberto
Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, Economic Theories About the Benefits and Costs of Patents, 32 J.
ECON. ISSUES 1031, 1039 (1998). Although it is not conventionally classified as a disclosure
theory, the prospect theory of patent law articulated by Edmund Kitch identifies another social
benefit that follows from patent law's one-to-many disclosure. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and
Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977). Disclosures reduce the wasteful,
duplicative efforts that occur when firms guard trade secrets. Id. at 279. If one firm's disclosure
teaches other firms an efficient process for making a wheel, the other firms' research and
development will no longer be focused on independently rediscovering that particular way of
making a wheel. Id. at 279-80.
32. The conventional rights-restriction theory of the disclosure limits patent rights so that
they are proportional to inventors' contribution to technological progress. See supra notes 21-26
and accompanying text. In contrast, the restriction on patentees' rights that is needed to protect
the public's pre-expiration access to disclosed knowledge does not demand proportionality
between inventors' contributions and their claims. To the contrary, it prohibits patentees from
obtaining certain types of exclusive rights; namely, those that interfere with the public privilege
to use disclosed knowledge prior to patent expiration.
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there must be limits on the rights that patent law can grant to
inventors. Under simple Hohfeldian logic, the patent owner cannot
have a right to exclude the public from engaging in certain uses of
disclosed knowledge if the public has a privilege to engage in those
33
very uses.
A bit of new terminology is helpful here. For convenience, this
Article refers to the uses of disclosed knowledge that inventors'
disclosure obligations vest in the public as uses of disclosed knowledge
itself. Inversely, this Article refers to the remaining uses of disclosed
knowledge that, if claimed and privatized, would not allow inventors
to opt out of their disclosure obligations as uses of disclosed knowledge
in technological applications.34 To illustrate with simple examples,
disseminating a text representing the fact that a new drug has a
particular molecular structure is a use of disclosed knowledge itself,
whereas manufacturing a pill containing molecules of the new drug is
a use of disclosed knowledge in a technological application. This newly
coined terminology is necessary because, to date, there has not been
any express discussion of the structural implications of inventors'
disclosure obligations, so there is no existing terminology for referring
to the affirmative public privilege to use disclosed knowledge that the
35
disclosure obligations entail.
Laying out the case that inventors' disclosure obligations
mandate doctrinal limits on the types of uses of disclosed knowledge
that inventors can control requires a defense of two interdependent
propositions. First, § 112(a) of the Patent Act establishes an as-ofright public privilege to use disclosed knowledge itself during a
patent's term. Second, other sections of the Patent Act must impose
limits on the rights to which patentees are entitled in order to
preserve this privilege and prevent inventors from privatizing it
through strategic claiming. The remainder of this Part examines each
33. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30 (1913) (arguing that every legal advantage attained by
one person forcibly implicates a correlative disadvantage suffered by another person).
34. This terminology is imperfect. For other attempts by the author to coin language for
drawing similar distinctions, see Collins, supra note 4, at 1281, 1295 (positing a
knowledge/embodiment dichotomy); Kevin Emerson Collins, Claims to Information Qua
Information and a Structural Theory of Section 101, 4 I/S: J.L. & POL. FOR INFO. SOC'Y 11, 11
(2008) (distinguishing patentable and unpatentable embodiments of information).
35. Most commentary addressing the pre-expiration strain of public-knowledge disclosure
theory only refers to the public's privileged uses in the negative, noting that the public is free to
use disclosed knowledge in any way that does not produce a technology that falls within the
scope of a claim. See, e.g., infra notes 41-48, 53-55, and accompanying text. This way of talking
about the issue is inadequate. It makes the thesis of this Article-namely, that some uses of
disclosed knowledge cannot be privatized, regardless of the claims that inventors seekimpossible to articulate.
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proposition in turn. To calibrate expectations, it is perhaps important
to reiterate that the reason for making this case is not that
contemporary patent law grants vastly overbroad rights or that
radical changes to the scope of what can be patented are needed to
fully protect the public privilege to use disclosed knowledge itself. As
explored below in Part III, contemporary patent law already provides
de facto protection for the core of the public pre-expiration privilege to
use disclosed knowledge itself, and the contested issues lie only at
selected spots on the periphery of the privilege. 36 Thus, in most, but
not all, situations, the most important reasons for exploring the
structural implications of inventors' disclosure obligations are
increased conceptual coherency and legitimacy in patent doctrine.
As to the first proposition, an as-of-right public privilege to use
disclosed knowledge itself during a patent's term is not expressly
codified in the Patent Act. Rather, it must be inferred from the Act's
deep structure.3 7 The explicit text of § 112(a) does not limit what
inventors can claim or the exclusive rights to which they are entitled;
it does not expressly provide for a public privilege to use disclosed
knowledge itself before patent expiration. Section 112(a) only specifies
the type of knowledge that must be disclosed in the specification. 38 It
says nothing in overt terms about ensuring that the public can use
that knowledge in any way prior to patent expiration, although the
timing of the publication of the disclosure upon issuance, or usually
beforehand, does permit an inference that the public is intended to
benefit from the disclosure in some way prior to expiration. 39 Yet, the
prominent billing given to the public-knowledge theory of the
36. The task of determining what changes to contemporary patent law are needed to fully
protect this privilege is complicated by controversies about both the set of activities that should
constitute the public privilege to the use of disclosed knowledge itself at its periphery and the
state of contemporary patent law. See generally infra Part III.
37. See infra notes 56-67 and accompanying text (grounding the public privilege to use
disclosed knowledge itself in a structural interpretation of the Patent Act).
38. The statute states:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it
is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode
contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.
35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
39. Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 1022 ("If the public had absolutely no right to use the
disclosure without the patent holder's consent until after the patent expired, it would make little
sense to require that the disclosure be made freely available to the public at the outset of the
patent term."). Eisenberg makes this argument in the context of arguing that some experimental
uses of claimed technologies should not amount to infringement. Id. This Article does not reach
the experimental use issue but instead argues that the public should be able to use the disclosed
knowledge itself prior to patent expiration.
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disclosure, and its pre-expiration branch in particular, strongly
suggests that a privilege has by now been read into § 112(a). As the
following paragraphs demonstrate, the assumption that the public has
an affirmative privilege to use disclosed knowledge itself during the
patent term permeates patent opinions and scholarship on
disclosure. 40 Interestingly, however, the privilege has never been given
an in-depth treatment. The explanation for this repeated superficial
treatment is likely that the privilege is so fundamental in the patent
community that it is not treated as a legal assertion in need of an
extensive defense or prolonged justification.
Courts usually state the privilege to use disclosed knowledge
itself during the patent term in passing as a premise in arguments
that are focused elsewhere. For example, as the Supreme Court stated
in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. in the lead up to its holding that
federal patent law does not preempt state trade secrecy laws, "When a
patent is granted and the information contained in it is circulated to
the general public and those especially skilled in the trade, such
additions to the general store of knowledge ... stimulate ideas and the
41
eventual development of further significant advances in the art."
Similarly, in the course of discussing the patent-ineligible subject
matter, the Federal Circuit, almost as an aside, noted that "[e]ven
after a patent has been awarded for a new, useful, and nonobvious
practical application of an idea, others may learn from the underlying
ideas, theories, and principles [conveyed in the disclosure] to
legitimately 'design around' the patentee's useful application." 42 These
are typical of the judicial statements that posit the existence of a
public privilege to engage in certain uses of disclosed knowledge, such
as uses that "stimulate ideas" in the public's minds and uses that
allow the public to "learn from" the knowledge, without exploring the
privilege in detail.
40.

See infra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.

41. 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974). At the time, patent disclosures were not published until
issuance. Today, information is often circulated to the general public at an earlier publication
date. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b).
42. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Archer, C.J., dissenting); see also In
re Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1390, 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (Baldwin, J., concurring) (noting that
disclosures add "a measure of worthwhile knowledge to the public storehouse" when they become
accessible to the public). When linking the right to design-around to the use of disclosed
knowledge itself, it is important to differentiate two possible points of infringement. First, to
successfully design-around a patent claim, the end product or method must not fall within the
original claim. Second, to avoid infringement, the access to, dissemination of, and cognition
employing the disclosed knowledge that occurs during the design-around process, likely before
the end product or method has been developed, must not violate the original patent owner's
rights. Only the second possible point of infringement is relevant to the public privilege to use
the disclosed knowledge itself as defined in this Article.
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Patent scholars have taken a similar approach: the public
privilege to use disclosed knowledge itself is taken as axiomatic, not a
topic that merits prolonged consideration. In his patent treatise, Peter
Rosenberg notes that "anyone is free to think and to write about what
is covered by the patent without trespassing upon the exclusive right
of the patentee." 43 In the course of laying the groundwork for the
experimental use doctrine, Rebecca Eisenberg notes that the
"disclosure becomes freely available to the public as soon as the patent
issues; the patent holder may not thereafter monitor or control access
to it."44 In a similar context, Kathy Strandburg opines that "the
disclosure requirements are intended to benefit the public interest in
faster-paced follow-on innovation by privileging the 'use' of a patented
inventive idea in developing improved or alternative follow-on
inventions during the patent term. No license or authorization is
required for this activity. ' 45 In explaining the public benefit of
disclosures, Jeanne Fromer asserts, without any discussion of the
mechanism involved, that disclosures "stimulate[] future innovation
by revealing the invention's design so that others can ... design
around, improve upon, or be inspired by the invention, even during
the patent term."46 These respected commentators, as well as many
others, 47 take the existence of a public privilege to use disclosed
knowledge itself during the patent term for granted.
43. PETER D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS 10 (1975).
44. Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 1022.
45. Strandburg, supra note 15, at 101. Note the scare quotes around the word "use": the
use of disclosed knowledge itself is taken to be something different from the normal meaning of
the term "use" in the sense of the use of a patented idea in a technological application that can
infringe a patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) (including the right to "use" claimed technology
among patentees' exclusive rights).
46. Fromer, supra note 15, at 541; see also Strandburg, supra note 15, at 106.
47. See, e.g., Daniel R. Cahoy, Treating the Legal Side Effects of Cipro®:A Reevaluation of
Compensation Rules for Government Takings of Patent Rights, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 125, 131-32
(2002) (arguing that "the inventor's disclosure ... promotes the progress of the 'useful arts'
by... conveying knowledge of state-of-the-art innovations to the public while they are still
current, creating an incentive for clever individuals to design around the invention"); Timothy R.
Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 133 (2006) ("[T]he disclosure in the
patent is ...

designed ...

to enrich the state of the art contemporaneously with the invention.");

Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriatingthe Returns from Industrial Research and Development, in
3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783, 805 (1987) ("The choice between obtaining a
patent and maintaining secrecy may be influenced by the extent to which the disclosures made
in the patent document facilitate inventing around the patent."); Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of
Claim Interpretation,14 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 1, 4 n.10 (2000):
It would be difficult to overstate the importance of patent law's disclosure
requirements .... A principal function of the disclosure requirements is to provide
other artisans in the technical field with information that enlarges the storehouse of
knowledge, and therefore spur these artisans to improve upon or design around the
claimed invention-thus leading to further technological progress;
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Rebecca Eisenberg and Arti Rai provide one of the most indepth discussions of the public privilege to use knowledge itself during
a patent's term that is worth quoting at length:
Information is so valuable that society will not permit it to be monopolized. This is the
sense that emerges from reading cases about disclosure in the patent system, in which
courts treat the informational content of patent applications as the public's quid pro quo
that justifies the issuance of patents. In this story, disclosure of unprotected information
is not an incidental byproduct of a process that aims to motivate something more
worthwhile, but is the whole purpose of the system. We promote disclosure of precious
information by rewarding disclosure with exclusionary rights in something else.
By requiring public disclosure of information about an invention while limiting the
exclusive rights to the inventions defined in claims, patent law not only fails to protect
information but actually pushes it into the public domain as a spillover. Yet, while the
information disclosed in a patent application is publicly available, the exclusionary
rights from the patent might still protect the patent owner from its unauthorized use if
the use involves infringing the patent claims. If an inventor discloses in a patent
application how to make and use a new mousetrap and a patent issues with claims
drawn to the mousetrap, anyone who follows the directions in the disclosure to make
and use the claimed mousetrap would be liable for infringement. A reader, on the other
hand, who uses the disclosed information to problem-solve and devise a new springloaded device falling outside the scope of the mousetrap patent claims would not be
liable, though the patent disclosure may have been invaluable to the reader in solving
his problem. While patent claims legally constrain the use of information disclosed in
of the information may also facilitate other
patent specifications, the public disclosure
48
non-infringing uses of that information.

Two points in this passage are worth highlighting. First, Eisenberg
and Rai emphasize that a public privilege to use disclosed knowledge
itself during a patent's term is an important design feature of the
Patent Act: patent law doesn't passively "fail to protect" knowledge
but rather actively "pushes it into the public domain as a spillover"
due to the high social value of public knowledge. Second, they suggest
that, in order to understand how patent protection works, we need to
be able to draw a line between uses of disclosed knowledge itself (the
"disclosure" that is given to the public) and uses of disclosed
knowledge in technological embodiments (the "something else" in
which exclusive rights are granted).
Assuming the existence of a public privilege to use disclosed
knowledge itself has been established, the second proposition is that
doctrinal restrictions on patentees' rights are needed to protect this
privilege by preventing a patent owner from using strategically
drafted claims to privatize the very activities that public-knowledge
David J. Teece & Edward F. Sherry, Standards Setting and Antitrust, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1913,
1964 (2003) ("[I1f [an] application is immediately made public, others can see the disclosure and
rush in to file patent applications that 'flank' the initial application.").
48. Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Arti K. Rai, Harnessing and Sharing the Benefits of StateSponsored Research: Intellectual Property Rights and Data Sharing in California's Stem Cell
Initiative, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1187, 1194-95 (2006) (citations omitted).
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disclosure theory assumes he must publicize. Sometimes, legal rules
are not necessary to prevent behavior from occurring because the
behavior cannot be accomplished given the current state of
technology. 4 9 If no skilled patent drafter could ever draft a claim that
would turn the use of disclosed knowledge itself into infringement,
then no doctrinal restrictions on patent rights would be needed to
enforce inventors' disclosure obligations. Polk Wagner alluded to this
possibility when he argued that patent disclosures inevitably create
spillovers because "[i]t turns out that information," or knowledge as
discussed here, "does 'want to be free.'"50 However, the belief that the
use of knowledge itself is inevitably beyond the reach of patent
protection, regardless of the rules defining the contours of inventors'
rights, is misguided: human mental states and extramental signs both
embody human knowledge, and both can readily be described by
patent claims. 5 1 Thus, doctrinal limits on patentees' rights are needed
to guarantee the public privilege to use disclose knowledge itself prior
to patent expiration.
For proof of concept, consider two simple hypotheticals.
Imagine that an inventor has developed a new method of using XYZ, a
pharmaceutical drug, based on the fact that the adverse side effects of
XYZ are significantly reduced if XYZ is regularly consumed with
grapefruit juice. A patent drafter could claim "printed matter
conveying the fact that XYZ's side effects are significantly reduced
when consumed with grapefruit juice." Alternatively, the drafter could
describe the method of "reading a statement of the fact that XYZ's side
effects are significantly reduced when consumed with grapefruit
juice," "communicating the fact that XYZ's side effects are
significantly reduced when consumed with grapefruit juice," or simply
"understanding that XYZ's side effects are significantly reduced when
consumed with grapefruit juice." These hypothetical claims
demonstrate that, absent provisions in patent law that restrict what
49. For example, even assuming a public right to live on a planet free from teleportation,
no legal prohibition on teleportation is today needed to protect that right because teleportation is
impossible, at least given current technology.
50. R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and the
Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 999 (2003). In reaching this conclusion, Wagner
appears to only consider claims drafted at high levels of generality, not claims that encompass
uses of disclosed knowledge itself. Id. at 995-99
51. We often talk about the use of disclosed knowledge itself as "disembodied" as shorthand
to differentiate it from the uses of disclosed knowledge that routinely give rise to infringement.
See, e.g., Zvi Griliches, The Search for R&D Spillovers, 94 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 29, 39 (1992).
If knowledge had no material basis, then it might be difficult to refer to with the descriptive
language of a patent claim. However, technological knowledge does not float somewhere in a
noetic ether. It exists in the material world in the form of both meaningful mental states and
extramental signs that are meaningful to human minds. Collins, supra note 4, at 1283-84.
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can be patented, patent owners could strategically draft claims
privatizing the very uses of disclosed knowledge itself that they are
supposed to publicize. Concededly, they likely seem farfetched with
respect to the claims that applicants regularly seek in practice. But
this observation is beside the point given the argument at hand. These
claims deviate from the norm we know today only because there are
well-established restrictions on patentability that would lead to their
rejection at the PTO. 52 We need patent doctrine that limits patentees'
rights in order to protect the public's ability to use disclosed
knowledge itself during the term of a patent. Without it, inventors
could use strategically drafted claims to opt out of their obligation to
make uses of disclosed knowledge itself freely available to the public
during the patent term.
It is principally the defense of the second premise-namely, the
need for doctrinal limits on patentees' rights to protect the public
privilege to use disclosed knowledge itself during the term of a
patent-that differentiates the structural implications of inventors'
disclosure obligations addressed in this Article from prior scholarship
on patent disclosure. Prior scholarship assumes that the public's
ability to use disclosed knowledge itself will necessarily lie beyond the
reach of patentees' claims; it fails to consider that patentees' rights
must be proactively limited in order to protect that ability and
establish it as an as-of-right privilege.5 3 The Eisenberg and Rai

52. The argument rebutted here is the aggressive argument that patent drafters could not
draft claims that read on the public's use of disclosed knowledge itself even if they were freed
from the restraints imposed by the statutory restrictions on patentability such as novelty,
nonobviousness, utility, enablement, and patent eligibility. Part III addresses the more modest
argument that patent drafters cannot draft valid claims that interfere with the public privilege
to use disclosed knowledge itself given the current state of patent law and its limits on what can
be patented. See infra Part III. This modest argument is complicated by controversies about both
the set of activities that should constitute the public privilege to use disclosed knowledge itself at
its periphery and the state of contemporary patent law.
53. The presumption that the public privilege to use disclosed knowledge itself is simply a
privilege to engage in unclaimed uses of technology is commonplace. See ROSENBERG, supra note
43, at 10 (stating that the public privilege to use disclosed knowledge itself is limited by the
principle that "none but the patentee or his licensees may lawfully embody what is covered by
that patent, as by constructing the claimed device or by carrying out the steps of the claimed
process"); Strandburg, supra note 15, at 101 (defining the public privilege as existing "as long as
no one makes an embodiment of the follow-on invention that incorporates an infringing
embodiment of the original invention"). One exception is a passage by Rebecca Eisenberg
alluding to the structural implications of inventors' disclosure obligations. Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Re-Examining the Role of Patents in Appropriatingthe Value of DNA Sequences, 49 EMORY L.J.
783, 787 (2000) ("The exclusion of information itself from patent protection is also at least
implicit in the statutory requirement that patent applicants make full disclosures of information
about their inventions, with no restrictions upon public access to the disclosures once the patents
issue.").
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passage quoted above 54 is typical in this respect: the only legal
principle shaping the public's ability to use disclosed knowledge itself
during the patent term discussed in the passage is the practice of
'55
"limiting the exclusive rights to the inventions defined in claims.
The public's ability to use disclosed knowledge itself during the patent
term is simply the ground to the figure of the exclusive rights granted
to the patentee, and there is no mention of the limit on the exclusiverights figure that is needed to protect and shape the public-privilege
ground.
Before moving on in Part III to discuss the substantive reach of
the public privilege to use disclosed knowledge itself and thus the
restrictions on patentees' rights that are needed to safeguard the
privilege, it is worth pausing and addressing the statutory basis for
those restrictions.5 6 There is no statutory provision that expressly
articulates the restrictions. 57 Rather, the statutory basis for the
restrictions follows from a structural interpretation of the statutes
defining patentees' rights. Structural interpretation looks to the
structure and purpose of a statutory regime as a whole when
construing the language of any particular section of that regime. 58 The
Patent Act has clear structure. It is built on a dual regime of
publicizing disclosures and privatizing claims.5 9 Section 112(a)
implicitly codifies the disclosure side of the duality by establishing a
public privilege to use disclosed knowledge itself before patent
expiration. 60 A structural theory of statutory interpretation demands
that the Patent Act's many sections other than § 112(a) that establish
the rights of a patent owner be read in light of § 112(a) so as not to
interfere with that privilege. In most circumstances, it is patent law's
validity provisions defining the scope of a valid claim that will require
structural interpretation. 61 In rarer circumstances, it is the
54. See supra text accompanying note 48.
55. Eisenberg & Rai, supra note 48, at 1194.
56. This Article leaves aside the issue of whether the Intellectual Property Clause of the
Constitution or the First Amendment require a public privilege to use disclosed knowledge itself
prior to patent expiration.
57. Section 112(a) does not even expressly articulate the public privilege to use disclosed
knowledge itself, let alone the restrictions on patent rights that are needed to safeguard it. See
supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
58. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S.
645, 655 (1995); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIc STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 118-19

(Harvard Univ. Press 1994).
59. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
60. See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
61. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, 112 (2012) (codifying the principal validity provisions).
Elsewhere, I have argued in favor of using a structural theory of statutory interpretation when
construing the patent-eligibility provisions of § 101 in particular. Collins, supra note 4, at 1315-
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infringement provisions defining patentees' rights with respect to
62
their claimed inventions that will require structural interpretation.
Regardless of the particular type of statute at issue, however, courts
can use structural statutory interpretation to find the breathing room
in the Patent Act that Congress created to enforce inventors'
obligations under the public-knowledge theory of the disclosure, even
though that breathing room is not expressly articulated in any
particular statutory provision.
One example of what the output of such structural
interpretation of patent law's validity provisions might look like is the
printed matter doctrine. 63 As explored in greater depth below, the
contemporary printed matter doctrine, grossly stated, prohibits the
patenting of texts representing the knowledge disclosed in a patent
specification, and it plays an important role in limiting patent
protection to avoid conflict with the public privilege to use disclosed
knowledge itself before expiration. 64 Yet, the Patent Act does not
expressly provide for the printed matter doctrine in any of its statutes.
Rather, under the banner of the printed matter doctrine, courts have
read restrictions on patent rights into several different validity
provisions in several different statutes. They have read a restriction
into § 101. Books conveying newly discovered knowledge to readers
are "manufactures" in the plain-meaning sense of the term,6 5 but
courts have interpreted the statutory command in § 101 that a
"manufacture" is patent eligible narrowly so that it excludes such
books. 66 Courts have also read restrictions into the novelty doctrine of
§ 102 and the nonobviousness doctrine of § 103. Although there is
nothing to this effect in the statutory text, courts have interpreted

20; Kevin Emerson Collins, Semiotics 101: Taking the Printed Matter Doctrine Seriously, 85 IND.
L.J. 1379, 1427-30 (2010); Collins, supra note 34, at 19-26. Although § 101 is a logical home for
many of the limitations needed to protect the pre-expiration public privilege to use disclosed
knowledge, I remain agnostic here on which provisions of the Patent Act should be interpreted in
a structural manner to preserve that privilege.
62. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012) (codifying infringement).
63.
Courts do not recognize that the printed matter doctrine is the result of structural
statutory interpretation. However, structural statutory interpretation provides an otherwise
absent explanation for what the printed matter doctrine is and what it does.
64.
See infra notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
65. The Oxford English Dictionary defines a manufacture as "an article, material, or
commodity produced by physical labour, machinery, etc." Manufacture, OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY,

http://www.oed.com/viewlEntry/113769?rskey=yfip2N&result=1&isAdvanced=false

#eid (last visited Aug. 23, 2016) [https://perma.cc/U4HV-ZXFH].
66. See In re Sterling, 70 F.2d 910, 912 (C.C.P.A. 1934) (holding that the substance or
language of that which is printed may not constitute patentable subject matter); In re Russell, 48
F.2d 668, 669 (C.C.P.A. 1931) ("The mere arrangement of printed matter... in book
form ...

does not constitute 'any ...

manufacture' as provided in [the Patent Act].").
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these sections to frequently ignore the content of printed matter when
67
assessing the distinction of a claimed invention from the prior art.
The best explanation for this diverse set of interpretations of the
statutes that restrict patentees' exclusive rights lies in a structural
theory of statutory interpretation. To protect the public privilege to
use disclosed knowledge itself before patent expiration, several
different validity provisions in several different statutes must all be
interpreted in light of § 112(a). Although it is not recognized as such
today, the printed matter doctrine is a model for the structural
statutory interpretation that is needed to enforce inventors' disclosure
obligations.
III. WHAT ACTIVITIES ARE USES OF DISCLOSED KNOWLEDGE ITSELF?

The argument in the previous Part establishes in principle that
the inventors' disclosure obligations have structural implications. If
the public is to have an as-of-right privilege to use disclosed
knowledge itself before patent expiration, patentees' statutory rights
must be limited so that they do not interfere with that privileged use.
The argument in this Part starts to fill in the content of the public
privilege to use disclosed knowledge itself. Which uses of disclosed
knowledge are unpatentable uses of disclosed knowledge itself and
which are (possibly) patentable uses of disclosed knowledge in
technological applications? In other words, what limits on patentees'
exclusive rights are necessary to safeguard the public privilege? 68 The
opinions and commentaries discussing the public benefits of freely
available disclosed knowledge before patent expiration center on two
activities. First, they address knowledge dissemination. Second, they
address the imaginative human cognition that employs knowledge as

67. See In re Ngai, 367 F.3d 1336, 1338-39 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (rejecting a claim for a
combination of a known product and novel written instructions for lack of novelty); In re Gulack,
703 F.2d 1381, 1385-87 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (employing the printed matter doctrine to determine
that a claim was nonobvious in relation to the prior art). Michael Risch has proposed that the
printed matter doctrine should be conceived as part of the § 101 utility doctrine. Michael Risch, A
Surprisingly Useful Requirement, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 57, 80-81 (2011). In effect, Risch
proposes a structural interpretation of the word "useful" in § 101 in light of the implicit
requirement in § 112(a) for a public privilege to use disclosed knowledge itself prior to expiration.
If one is willing to import a point of novelty or patentable-weight approach into the utility
doctrine, this structural interpretation of the Patent Act is also a reasonable one. Cf. infra notes
104-105 (noting the printed matter doctrine employs the controversial point of novelty or
patentable-weight approach).
68. This Article does not consider experimental uses of claimed, technological applications
to be uses of disclosed knowledge itself, and it therefore does not address the implications of the
pre-expiration strain of public-knowledge disclosure theory for the common law experimental use
doctrine. See Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 1022; supra note 39.
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an input and yields the conception of a design-around or improvement
technology as an output.6 9 There may be other ways to slice up the
privilege, but the analysis below focuses on these two activities in
order to flush out the privilege's contested details.
To avoid confusion, it is important to emphasize up front that
the enablement and written description doctrines of § 112(a), which
are the conventional focus of the rights-limitation theory of the
disclosure,7 0 do not provide the restrictions on patent protection
needed to enforce inventors' disclosure obligations. Inventors'
disclosure obligations mandate that inventors must be denied certain
rights (i.e., rights that interfere with the public use of disclosed
knowledge itself) regardless of how much and what type of knowledge
the inventor discloses. Neither enablement nor written description
does this work. The inventor can enable and demonstrate possession
of any useful technology, provided he discloses enough knowledge
about both how to make and use it and what it is as a structural'
matter. Viewed in a different way, greater disclosure leads to fewer
restrictions on rights under enablement and written description. In
contrast, under the structural implications of inventors' disclosure
obligations, greater disclosure means a larger set of activities that
constitute the public privilege to use the disclosed knowledge itself
and a larger set of unobtainable rights.
A. Dissemination
The privilege to disseminate disclosed knowledge is part of the
public privilege to use disclosed knowledge itself before patent
expiration. 71 If claims to tangible representations of newly discovered
knowledge were valid, anyone who duplicates or distributes the patent
document, or who conveys the disclosed knowledge in another form,
would be labeled as an infringer because he would make or use the
claimed invention. 72 A patent regime that enforced such claims and

69. See supra notes 38-48 and accompanying text. Patent opinions and commentary also
assume a public privilege to access disclosed knowledge. Access is today guaranteed by the free,
electronic publication of issued patents and most patent applications. Cf. 37 C.F.R. § 1.71(e)
(2013) (prohibiting the assertion of copyright rights in patent disclosures).
70. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
71. "[Tjhe patent statute does not identify the mere dissemination of data as a potentially
" Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Elan Pharm., Inc., 786 F.3d 892, 898
infringing activity ..
(Fed. Cir. 2015). The Federal Circuit made this statement in the context of the statutory
research exemption, but the reasoning employed suggests that it is not specific to that context.
72. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) (defining direct infringement). If such claims were
enforceable, patent protection would resemble copyright protection on steroids. Because of the
idea/expression dichotomy, normal copyright finds infringement by duplication, dissemination, or
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failed to protect a public privilege for the dissemination of disclosed
knowledge would have an upside. It would allow inventors to
internalize a larger fraction of the social welfare gain attributable to
their research and development and thereby augment inventors'
incentives to innovate yet further. In fact, it would plug an innovationincentive hole: technological knowledge is often scientifically
groundbreaking, costly to produce, and economically valuable, but the
public privilege to disseminate disclosed knowledge means that
innovators who generate knowledge without generating other new and
useful things or processes get no patent protection, and thus have no
patent-induced incentives. 73 But this cost of reduced innovation
incentives attributable to the public privilege to disseminate
knowledge is presumptively outweighed by the benefits of making the
disclosed knowledge freely available to the public for distribution
before patent expiration under the public-knowledge theory of the
disclosure.
In our actual patent regime, the heavy lifting needed to protect
the core of the public privilege to disseminate disclosed knowledge is
already being done: the often maligned, and yet more often ignored,
printed matter doctrine does the needed work. 74 The courts have
interpreted the printed matter doctrine expansively to shield the
dissemination of disclosed knowledge from privatization by patent
claims, regardless of whether the knowledge is represented as printed
text on paper,7 5 electrons on a computer storage medium, 76 audio

performance of a text only when the defendant's text is substantially similar to original
expression in the plaintiffs text. Substantial similarity of ideas alone cannot support
infringement. See Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 268 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[C]opyright
protection extends only to a particular expression of an idea, and not to the idea itself."). A
patent regime that treats the dissemination of knowledge as infringement would hinge on the
similarity of the factual knowledge represented in the defendant's text and the factual
knowledge that an inventor discloses in the specification. It would protect what is labeled as a
type of idea under copyright law.
73. Today, a combination of the printed matter doctrine and inherency produces this
outcome. See King Pharm., Inc. v. Eon Labs, Inc., 616 F.3d 1267, 1274-80 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(employing both the printed matter doctrine and inherency to deny patent protection when an
inventor discovers new knowledge about already-existing technology).
74. The doctrine is maligned for its lack of a statutory basis. See infra note 81 and
accompanying text. It is ignored in the sense both that it is not discussed in patent casebooks
and that courts frequently chose to resolve printed matter cases in unpublished opinions. Collins,
supra note 4, at 1346-47.
75. See In re Ngai, 367 F.3d 1336, 1338-39 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (applying the printed matter
doctrine to instructions included with a kit of chemicals).
76. Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg. 7478, 7481-82
(Feb. 28, 1996) (discussing nonfunctional descriptive material in Beauregardclaims).
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recordings, 77 or sound waves in the air. 78 It is in large part thanks to
the printed matter doctrine that openly recognizing inventors'
disclosure obligations does not require a radical alteration of the reach
of contemporary patent protection. 79 Instead, acknowledging
inventors' disclosure obligations "merely" offers a logical explanation
for why the printed matter doctrine should be doing the work that it
already does. It "merely" creates conceptual clarity in an otherwise
difficult-to-explain doctrine and provides an otherwise absent
explanation for how the printed matter doctrine follows from the deep
structure of the Patent Act.80 This clarity and statutory grounding are
important because the Federal Circuit has repeatedly cited the
conceptual incoherence and nonstatutory nature of the printed matter
doctrine to question the doctrine's future viability.8 1 Here, work that is
"merely" conceptual housekeeping can have immediate, real-world
effects by ensuring that the printed matter doctrine gets the respect
that it is due when it enforces the Patent Act's deep structure and
protects public disclosures from privatization by claims.
In contrast, paying attention to the structural implications of
inventors' disclosure obligations may suggest changes to the rights
granted by the contemporary patent regime closer to the periphery of
the public privilege to disseminate disclosed knowledge. The
discussion below addresses three contestable issues concerning the
proper reach of this privilege: the dissemination of texts that are also
components of machines, the dissemination of instructional texts that
are packaged with technological embodiments, and the dissemination
82
of texts with an intent to induce infringement.
Before addressing these controversial issues, however, it is
perhaps helpful to pause and note two uncontroversial limits on the
77. Ex parte Carver, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 465, 467 (B.P.A.I. 1985) (applying the printed
matter doctrine to sound on a sound recording, although upholding the particular claim at issue).
78. King Pharm., Inc., 616 F.3d at 1279 (applying the printed matter doctrine to spoken
words).
79. This is a difficult proposition to support with a recent, litigated case. Litigated cases
involving these core dissemination claims are few and far between today because, knowing that
they will not obtain them, applicants do not draft them or appeal examiners' rejections of them.
80.
See supra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
81. See In re Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381, 1385 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("A 'printed matter rejection'
under § 103 stands on questionable legal and logical footing."); see also In re Lowry, 32 F.3d
1579, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (quoting Gulack, 703 F.2d at 1385 n.8).
82. Another contestable issue at the periphery of the public privilege to disseminate
disclosed knowledge arises when earlier inventors develop novel measurement instruments,
whether mechanical or electronic, and later inventors attach new labels to those instruments
instructing the public how to understand the instruments' information outputs in a different
manner. I have already addressed this issue at length elsewhere. See Collins, supra note 61, at
1431-42.
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knowledge-disseminating acts that constitute the public privilege to
disseminate disclosed knowledge. First, the privilege cannot
encompass the distribution of goods that are uses of disclosed
knowledge in technological applications, such as pharmaceutical pills
or mousetraps, even though this distribution entails the dissemination
of disclosed knowledge in the sense that users can examine the goods
and glean the knowledge from them.8 3 If it could, the exception would
become the rule and patent protection in its entirety would be
eliminated. The privilege must be limited to dissemination of the
disclosed knowledge in the form of signs that represent facts and
hypotheses about the world in a manner that is meaningful to a
human reader.8 4 The key here is representation. A representation uses
a social convention (such as the convention underlying the English
language) to convey knowledge to an interpreter who knows the social
convention. Representations are useful only in the sense that they
have meaning to a human interpreter, not in the sense that they
achieve a nonsemiotic goal.8 5 Second, the privilege to disseminate
disclosed knowledge cannot prevent patent rights from ever hindering
the dissemination of any knowledge representations. For example, an
uncontroversial patent on a compression technology may block the
86
effective distribution of representations of big data over a network.
The rights granted by patent claims conflict with the public privilege
to disseminate knowledge only when the claims in a patent are
targeted to the very knowledge that the patentee must disclose in the
specification to demonstrate an advance over the prior art (i.e., when
the claims recite the content of knowledge created by the inventor and
87
disclosed in the specification as a limitation).

83. Some goods are self-disclosing, as in the case of a simple mousetrap. Others are not
self-disclosing and must be reverse engineered to reveal the disclosed knowledge, as in the case
of a pharmaceutical pill. The distribution of both types of goods disseminates disclosed
knowledge.
84. A sign is something that stands for something else to an interpreter. Collins, supra
note 61, at 1408-17. Limiting the public privilege to the dissemination of signs allows
pharmaceutical pills and mousetraps to be patented. A pharmaceutical pill is not a sign that
means the pharmaceutical pill because, in a sign, something must stand for something else, not
for itself.
85. Collins, supra note 61, at 1413-17 (distinguishing causation from signification).
86. But cf. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 2016 WL 5539870, at *11-13
(Fed. Cir. Sept. 30, 2016) (Mayer, J., dissenting) (asserting that software claims to email filters
and virus screens were invalid due to the First Amendment).
87. At first glance, it may seem odd to be more concerned about narrower claims that recite
the content of knowledge as a limitation. The reason for this narrow focus is that only claims
reciting such limitations can rely on representations of newly created knowledge to establish an
advance over the prior art. See infra Section III.A.2.
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1. Texts That Are Also Components of Machines
Core acts of knowledge dissemination involve representations,
such as scientific articles or conference presentations, that are only
intelligible to a human reader or auditor.8 8 However, many
codifications of knowledge are both texts that are legible to human
minds through a social convention and components of, or instructions
for, machines that are causally driven by deterministic processes.
That is, they are what can be called texts/components.8 9 Computer
software is the most common example of a text/component.90 A human
computer programmer can read code as a set of representations: a
human mind understands what the code means and can acquire
knowledge from code about what functions the code performs when
executed. But software on a storage medium is also like a really
complex cog in a mechanical device. A computer can read software
code, too, but in a different sense of the word "read": the computer
deterministically follows the commands of the software code and.
actually executes its functions. The issue of texts that are also
components of machines extends beyond software. In the biomedical
arena, DNA molecules are the easiest examples of texts/components to
spot. 9 1 Using a sequencing machine, a researcher can read the linear
sequence of bases and, without actually producing a protein, glean
knowledge about the protein that it produces. A cell can "read" DNA
too, but only in the sense that it can follow the encoded instructions
and actually produce the encoded protein.
Texts/components raise interesting issues for the public
privilege to disseminate disclosed knowledge because, unlike texts,
components of machines are conventionally patentable inventions.
88. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
89. The difference between texts that are at the core of the dissemination privilege and
texts/components that are not is one reason why this Article uses the term "knowledge" rather
than "information." "Information" is ambiguous in that it can mean either instructions that are
meaningful to a human interpreter or instructions that are meaningful to a deterministic
machine. Collins, supra note 4, at 1312-14. In contrast, "knowledge" invokes the type of meaning
that resides in human minds but not the type of meaning that exists when deterministic
machines follow instructions. The very term "disclosure" suggests this mind-centered focus in
disclosure theory: while it is common to say that a text/component discloses information to a
human reader, it is awkward to talk about a text/component disclosing information to the
machine in which it functions as a component.
90. See Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEX. L. REV. 99, 101-05, 119-20 (2000)
("Software is not a text, it is a machine built of text.").
91.
See Eisenberg, supra note 53, at 786-89 (noting the dual nature of DNA as both
molecules and information); Symposium, Molecules vs. Information: Should Patents Protect
Both?, 8 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 190, 196 (2002) (presentation of Professor Rebecca S. Eisenberg).
For a view that all biotechnology is nothing but information, see Dan L. Burk, The Problem of
Process in Biotechnology, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 561, 582-88 (2006).
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Should the privilege to disseminate disclosed knowledge include a
privilege to disseminate texts/components? As a descriptive matter,
the answer today is the privilege does not extend this far. Patent
doctrine permits claims to texts/components. Software -on-disk claims
have been patentable ever since In re Beauregard in the 1990s, at
least provided that method or programmed-computer claims to the
same software invention are patentable.9 2 Similarly, DNA molecules
are patentable. The Supreme Court's recent opinion in Myriad
Genetics held that isolated genomic DNA molecules with sequences of
nucleotides corresponding to sequences that occur naturally are not
patent eligible because they are products of nature, but it upheld the
patentability of complementary DNA. 93 The patentability of
complementary DNA demonstrates the public privilege to disseminate
disclosed knowledge does not include a privilege to disseminate
biological texts that are also components of cellular machinery.
There is no a priori answer as to whether the structural
implications of inventors' disclosure obligations should prohibit the
patentability of human-readable texts that are also machine
components. On the one hand, valid claims to texts/components
prevent the dissemination of the knowledge disclosed in a patent in a
certain medium, and medium limitations usually do not save the
patentability of claims that interfere with the dissemination of
disclosed knowledge itself. A patentee cannot claim representations of
disclosed knowledge limited to text printed in a particular language, a
particular font, or on a particular type of paper any more than he can
claim representations of disclosed knowledge generally. On the other
hand, the gap in patent incentives that disallowing claims to
texts/components would create might be considerable, and, in the
software field, the formalism of allowing method and apparatus claims
to software, but not claims to software programs on disks, would be
difficult to swallow. In the end, to reach their current conclusion that
texts/components are patentable, the courts likely, albeit implicitly,
balanced the cost under disclosure theory (a minor impingement on
the public privilege to disseminate disclosed knowledge prior to
expiration) against the benefit under incentive theory (viable

92. 53 F.3d 1583, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see also Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S.
Ct. 2347, 2369 (2014) (holding that system, method, and media claims to software inventions rise
and fall together if they claim the same substance). A text/component that is a part of a machine
whose sole function is to display the knowledge represented by the text to a human user is
equivalent to a simple text and is not patent-eligible subject matter. Examination Guidelines for
Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg. 7478, 7481-82 (Feb. 28, 1996) (discussing
nonfunctional descriptive material).
93. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
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incentives to innovate) to conclude that texts/components should be
patentable. Yet, it is important to remain open to the idea that the
courts might reach a different conclusion in other circumstances. For
example, imagine an advance in computer compiler technology that
automatically translates an English-language description of computer
functionality into executable software code. 94 This advance would turn
almost any dissemination of the disclosed knowledge in a softwarepatent specification into the dissemination of a text/component. Here,
the balance might well come out the other way, as valid claims to
texts/components under these circumstances would significantly
95
hinder the free dissemination of disclosed knowledge.
The technological and economic transformation being wrought
by 3D printing and its democratization of manufacturing has put a
practical, real-world example of the text/component issue at the center
of contemporary patent debates. 96 In the traditional physical-product
economy, manufacturing is centralized. The inventor of a mechanical
device can enforce a patent against the limited number of
manufacturers and distributors rather than the much larger, and
more difficult to identify, group of the devices' end users, each with
only a small amount of damages at issue. Once 3D printing becomes
inexpensive and widespread, however, the economics of patent
still
enforcement will change. Centralized electronic repositories may
9 7 ut
create or simply aggregate 3D data files for mechanical devices,
only the end user who prints (i.e., "makes") the device for his or her
personal use will infringe traditional product claims. Absent some
change in patent law, the only way of enforcing traditional product
claims in a world in which 3D printing is commonplace will be the
94. Collins, supra note 61, at 1422 n.233.
95. See id. (proposing a merger doctrine for texts/components in patent law).
96. For scholarship examining the implications of 3D printing for patent law, see Daniel
Harris Brean, Asserting Patents to Combat Infringement via 3D Printing: It's No "Use," 23
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 771 (2013) [hereinafter Brean, It's No "Use'; Daniel
Harris Brean, Patenting Physibles: A Fresh Perspective for Claiming 3D-PrintableProducts, 55
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 837 (2015) [hereinafter Brean, Patenting Physibles]; Ben Depoorter,
Intellectual Property Infringements & 3D Printing:Decentralized Piracy, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1483
(2014); Deven R. Desai & Gerard N. Magliocca, Patents, Meet Napster: 3D Printing and the
Digitization of Things, 102 GEO. L.J. 1691, 1703-05 (2014); Sam Dillon, Infringement by
Blueprint: Protecting Patent Rights in a World of Low-Cost 3D Printing, 42 AIPLA Q.J. 425
(2014); Timothy R. Holbrook & Lucas S. Osborn, Digital Patent Infringement in an Era of 3D
Printing,48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1319 (2015); Mark A. Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity, 90
N.Y.U. L. REV. 460, 471-75 (2015); Lucas S. Osborn, Regulating Three-Dimensional Printing:
The Converging World of Bits and Atoms, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 553 (2014); Skyler R. Peacock,
Note, Why Manufacturing Matters: 3D Printing, Computer-Aided Designs, and the Rise of EndUser Patent Infringement, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1933, 1934-35 (2014).
97. The existence of centralized repositories is contingent on decentralized, peer-to-peer
networks not becoming the norm.
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economically questionable suits against end users that are not
necessary in the traditional, physical-product economy.
To deal with the altered economics of patent enforcement in a
world of democratized 3D printing, patent commentators have
proposed a variety of changes to patent law that would shore up
patentees' rights. The simplest of these proposals is to treat the
creation or sale of executable data files for 3D printers as patentable
embodiments of mechanical-device inventions.9 8 In fact, this proposal
may not require any departure from existing law. An electronic
representation of a patentable product that only conveys knowledge
about the form of a patented product to a human computer user is not
today patentable under the printed matter doctrine. 99 However, an
executable data file is a text/component, just like software code in
general: it represents the shape of an object to a human interpreter
and it is a cog in a deterministic machine that actually makes the
object. Thus, if In re Beauregard were unquestioningly transposed to
data files for 3D printers, then executable data files would seem to be
patentable. 10 0 The proposal to interpret In re Beauregardto executable
data files would curtail inventors' disclosure obligations, but whether
it should be held to impermissibly impinge on the public privilege to
disseminate knowledge presents a legitimately contested policy
issue. 10 1 One important technological fact in this debate is the extent
98. Dillon, supra note 96, at 452-55. Holbrook and Osborn argue that a sale or offer to sell
an electronic, 3D representation should constitute direct infringement, but not the acts of
making or using it. Holbrook & Osborn, supra note 96, at 1327-28. Daniel Brean goes much
further, proposing that electronic representations of patentable 3D objects should be patentable,
regardless of whether they are executable data files. Brean, Patenting Physibles, supra note 96,
at 849-53. A related issue has already arisen in the courts: the International Trade Commission
asserted jurisdiction over the "importation" of a patented invention in the form of electronic
representations of objects entering the United States over the internet, but the Federal Circuit
rejected the assertion. ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 810 F.3d 1283 (Fed.
Cir. 2015).
99. See supra note 76 and accompanying text (noting that the printed matter doctrine
applies to electronic representations); supra note 92 (noting that a machine being able to display
the knowledge represented by the electronic representation to a human does not make the
representation into a text/component).
100. See Brean, Patenting Physibles, supra note 96, at 845-47 (stating that a "CAD file
distributor has 'made' the claimed invention because the act of storing the digital file on the
server created the claimed storage medium with the claimed data on it"); Dillon, supra note 96,
at 452-55 ("As long as this apparatus is itself a patent-eligible invention (such as a new
mousetrap), a Beauregard claim covering its digital design should likewise be patent-eligible.");
Osborn, supra note 96, at 587 (proposing Beauregard-styleclaims to protect CAD files).
101. One insightful student note invokes inventors' disclosure obligations as a reason to
question the patentability of electronic representations of patentable objects. Peacock, supra note
96, at 1948 ("The existence of the disclosure requirement could obviate any claim of a proprietary
interest an inventor might assert in relation to a CAD containing the schematics for his patented
creation.").
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to which alternative, nonpatented channels of knowledge transmission
remain available to the public if executable data files become
patentable. If any electronic representation of the 3D configuration of
the patented device can be automatically compiled into an executable
data file, then the proposal starts to look like a costly imposition on
knowledge dissemination. However, if electronic transmission of the
3D configuration of a patented device can be easily accomplished
without the transmitted data file being executable by a 3D printer,
then the patentability of executable data files for 3D printers is not
much different as a policy matter from the routine patentability of
texts/machines under contemporary patent law. 10 2 Of course, the
patent rights granted in this situation do not have significant value if
the work needed to transform a 3D representation into an executable
data file is minimal and does not require significant programming
expertise. This is simply the cost that must be paid to provide
reasonable protection for the public privilege to disseminate disclosed•
knowledge.
2. Old Products Combined with New Texts
The claims that most self-evidently conflict with the public
privilege to disseminate disclosed knowledge recite only a tangible
medium and a knowledge-bearing representation recorded on it. For
example, consider a product claim to printed matter representing a,
drug's dosage information or a method claim to verbally informing a
patient of a drug's dosage information. A more contestable type of
claim at the boundary of the public privilege is a combination claim to
the representation of disclosed knowledge together with a use of
disclosed knowledge in a technological application. For example,
consider a product claim to a combination of a bottle of pharmaceutical
pills with a label informing a patient that the drug should be
consumed in a particular fashion or a method claim reciting the steps
of giving the bottle to a patient and informing the patient that the
drug should be consumed in a particular fashion. 10 3
102. Daniel Brean's analysis implies that the step moving from a digital representation of
an object to an executable file for a 3D printer is significant. Brean, Patenting Physibles, supra
note 96, at 847-48 (discussing the process of "slicing"). Whether or not this step is significant
today, however, technological change is likely to make it insignificant tomorrow.
103. For examples of such pills-plus-labels claims, see AstraZeneca LP v. Apotex, Inc., 633
F.3d 1042 (Fed. Cir. 2010); King Pharm., Inc. v. Eon Labs, Inc., 616 F.3d 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Assuming that the conventional technology (i.e., the bottle of pills) is not independently
patentable, claims to the combination of the technology and the instructions have value to patent
owners for two reasons. First, if the recommended method of use is inherent in the prior art,
then the combination claims are likely to be the only form of patent protection available. Second,
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Does a claim to a technology in combination with a text
representing knowledge about how to use that technology conflict with
the public privilege to disseminate disclosed knowledge before patent
expiration? As a descriptive matter, the answer today is a firm "yes."
The printed matter doctrine has a well-established point-of-novelty or
patentable-weight approach for identifying distinction from the prior
art. Under most circumstances, the content of the printed matterthat is, the facts and hypotheses that a representation conveys to a
human reader-must be ignored when identifying whether a claimed
invention is novel and nonobvious in relation to the prior art. 10 4 If a
claim describes a combination of a bottle of pills and a representation
of instructions for use, the claim is invalid if the represented
10 5
knowledge is what differentiates the claim from the prior art.
Opinions applying the patentable-weight approach of the
printed matter doctrine usually justify the rule as a policy matter by
leaning on the inherency doctrine and noting that the discovery of new
knowledge about how an invention works does not allow the
technology to be patented again.1 0 6 In a revealing oversight, the
opinions do not examine the issue from the perspective of the
patentability of disclosed knowledge. Technically, inventors seeking to
patent claims to combinations of a prior art technology and
instructions for use are not trying to repatent the prior art technology.
They are only seeking rights to an improvement in the form of the
combination of the prior art technology and the instructions; even if
the technology-and-instructions claim is valid, the public is free to
continue using the prior art technology as it existed before the
combination was invented. Rather than focusing on inherency in their

if the recommended method of use can be captured in a valid method claim, then the combination
claim transforms secondarily liable inducers into direct infringers, reducing the difficulty of
proving infringement.
104. AstraZeneca LP, 633 F.3d at 1063-65; King Pharm., Inc., 616 F.3d at 1279; In re Ngai,
367 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The exception to this rule is when there is a functional
relationship between the printed matter and the remainder of the claimed subject matter. In re
Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381, 1386-87 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The argument that there is a functional
relationship between instructions about how to use a drug and the drug has been repeatedly
rejected. In re Huai-Hung Kao, 639 F.3d 1057, 1072-73 (Fed. Cir. 2011). But cf. In re Miller, 418
F.2d 1392, 1396 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (concluding that a false label on a measuring cup that aided the
creation of half-recipes had a functional relation to the measuring cup).
105. If the combination claim is novel and nonobvious without consideration of the content
of the instructions, then the combination claim is economically irrelevant. The broader claim to
the pills is valid, and it gives the inventor all of the rights that he would get from the
combination claim (and more).
106. See In re Ngai, 367 F.3d at 1339 (noting that anyone could patent products indefinitely
if courts accepted claims that simply attach a new set of instructions to a known product); see
also AstraZenaca, 633 F.3d at 1065 (quoting In re Ngai, 367 F.3d at 1339).
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policy analysis, courts should instead be focusing on inventors'
the
should
Under what conditions
disclosure obligations.
dissemination of disclosed knowledge constitute patent infringement?
Again, there is no a priori answer as to whether the structural
implications of inventors' disclosure obligations should prohibit the
patentability of human-readable, instructional texts when those texts
are claimed in combination with the technologies that the texts teach
readers how to use more effectively. On the one hand, technology-andinstructions claims do interfere with the dissemination of disclosed
knowledge to some degree. The interference is limited in that the
disclosed knowledge can still be freely disseminated so long as it is not
packaged with the technology that it teaches a reader how to use.
However, even this limited interference may be significant because it
complicates the dissemination of knowledge to the very end users of a
technology who could derive the greatest benefit from the knowledge.
Yet, on the other hand, technology-and-instructions claims seem like
an effective way of crafting claims that are proportional to inventors'
contributions to technological progress and providing some incentive
to researchers who only create new knowledge. To understand this
side of the debate, it is important to emphasize two points about the
limited costs of technology-and-instructions claims, as well as a third
point about their significant benefits. First, technology-andinstructions claims do not significantly impede competitors who seek
to develop design-arounds and improvements because the competitors
are motivated to avoid infringement simply by obtaining the
knowledge-conveying instructions and the prior art technologies from
different sources. Second, technology-and-instructions claims are
targeted at the end users of a technology who seek to use the
technology in the manner that the patentee envisions, because end
users who do not value the disclosed use can presumptively obtain the
technology alone, without either the instructions or the patent
premium. Third, technology-and-instructions claims would plug a hole
in patent protection that denies all protection to researchers who
discover new knowledge about already existing products. 10 7 Yet,
despite their relatively low cost and non-negligible benefit, the idea
that instructions to human users can constitute an advance over the
prior art that renders a claim patentable has, to date, run against the
grain of intuitive conceptions of inventors' disclosure obligations and
the public privilege to disseminate disclosed knowledge. The social
value of the public's ability to freely disseminate representations of
disclosed knowledge has carried the day.
107. See supranote 103 (discussing motivations for drafting pills-plus-labels claims).
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3. Inducement by Dissemination
The public privilege to disseminate disclosed knowledge allows
dissemination with an intent of commercial profit. For example, a
company can pay a researcher to identify and explain technology
disclosed in competitors' biotechnology patents, and the researcher is
not liable for patent infringement. A more contestable issue arises
when the dissemination is performed with an intent to induce
infringement. For example, what if the researcher obtains his paying
job of explaining patented technology by informing the company that
it would benefit from manufacturing the biotech drug claimed in the
patent? Or, what if an architect sells blueprints to a contractor
detailing how to construct an infringing curtain wall with an intent of
encouraging the contractor to build the infringing curtain wall?
As a doctrinal matter, this contestable issue boils down to an
unresolved question about the reach of patent law's active inducement
doctrine codified in § 271(b).10 8 Neither the researcher nor the
architect has directly infringed a patent in the above scenarios, 10 9 but
the open question is whether each can be liable for inducing someone
else's act of direct infringement. Inducement has two requirements.
First, the inducer must cause, urge, encourage, or aid someone to
commit infringement with knowledge that the induced acts constitute
patent infringement.1 1 0 Active inducement cannot be committed
through inaction; it requires an affirmative act of some kind. 1
Second, the induced party must actually engage in directly infringing
conduct. 11 2 In a typical inducement allegation, the alleged inducer
sells a tangible, multipurpose good to a customer and urges the
customer to use the good in an infringing manner. 113 The question at
the periphery of the public privilege to disseminate disclosed
knowledge confronting our biotech consultant and architect arises
when the alleged inducer's only conduct is the dissemination of the

108. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2012).
109. Neither has made, used, sold, offered to sell, or imported the patented invention, which
presumptively is the drug or the curtain wall. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) (defining direct
infringement). Both have made and sold representations of the knowledge disclosed in patents,
but any claims to such representations that might be sought interfere with the core of the public
privilege to disseminate knowledge and are thus invalid under the printed matter doctrine. See
supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
110. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 766 (2011).
111. Id. at 760; Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo Electron Co., 248 F.3d 1376, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
112. Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2119 (2014).
113. See, e.g., Arthrocare Corp. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 406 F.3d 1365, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (holding that the instructions for surgical probes sold by the defendant induced users to
use the probes in an infringing manner).
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knowledge disclosed in a patent-no material good is sold-with an
intent that the disclosed knowledge lead the knowledge recipient to
infringe the patent's claims. In other words, assuming the requisite
intent, can the dissemination of disclosed knowledge be an affirmative
1 14
act on which active inducement liability can rest?
As a descriptive matter, the answer is today unclear. One
prominent treatise cites cases establishing that the commercial
dissemination of information, standing alone, cannot be the act that
116
supports active inducement, regardless of the disseminator's intent.
By limiting the rights of the owner of a valid patent, these cases
suggest a robust interpretation of the public privilege to disseminate
disclosed knowledge prior to patent expiration. However, a number of
older cases that have never been expressly overruled suggest that the
dissemination of instructions or plans that instruct a user how to
infringe can support inducement liability if the dissemination is
116
performed with the requisite intent.
As a policy matter, the reach of inducement liability into the
dissemination of disclosed knowledge once again pits the costs of
curtailing the flow of disclosed knowledge against the costs of reducing
innovation incentives.1 17 An open empirical question about the
availability of other channels of dissemination should lie at the
foundation of the debate. How much, and what types of, knowledge
dissemination in our market economy would be impeded or more
costly if knowledge dissemination, standing alone, were to give rise to
inducement liability when performed with the requisite intent?
Importantly, the answer to this question may shift over time with the
rise of the digital economy. For example, the rise of 3D printing and

114. Infringement liability can also arise under contributory infringement, which, like
inducement, is a type of secondary liability. However, unlike inducement, contributory
infringement does not give rise to a contested issue on the periphery of the public privilege to use
disclosed knowledge itself during the patent term. Contributory infringement requires the sale of
a "component." 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2012). In a similar context, the Supreme Court has implied
that the sale of blueprints (and, presumptively, any representation of knowledge) is not the sale
of a component. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 450 (2007).
115. 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 17.04(4)(g) (Matthew Bender ed., 2015)
("Publication of information about a patented product or method does not constitute active
inducement unless accompanied by other activity, such as sale of material capable of an
infringing use.").
116. See, e.g., Toppan v. Tiffany Refrigerator Car Co., 39 F. 420, 421 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1889)
(holding defendant's act in furnishing his licensees with plans and drawings showing the device
from plaintiffs patent supported liability).
117. If there is no inducement liability, patent owners may still sue direct infringers.
However, a large number of suits against individual infringers is often not economically rational,
so the absence of inducement liability may mean no enforcement at all. See supra notes 96-97
and accompanying text (discussing the effects of 3D printing on patent enforcement).
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its disruption of the traditional economics of patent enforcement 11 8 are
putting pressure on the issue of inducement by knowledge
dissemination. While there are some disagreements over the
conditions under which direct infringement does and could arise,
scholars who have addressed the issue uniformly assume that the
dissemination of an electronic, 3D representation of a patented object,
standing alone, can give rise to inducement liability if it is performed
with an intent to induce infringement. 119 This outcome, however,
assumes away the contested question of whether trafficking in
disclosed knowledge, standing alone, is an act that can give rise to
liability for infringement or, alternatively, whether it is part of the
public privilege to disseminate disclosed knowledge.
B. Cognition
The public privilege to use disclosed knowledge itself prior to
patent expiration is not only a privilege to disseminate that
knowledge. It includes some mental, cognitive uses of that knowledge,
too. More specifically, descriptions of the privilege commonly reference
two distinct mental acts: the act of understanding the disclosed
knowledge 120 and the act of creative cognition that employs the
disclosed knowledge as an input and yields the conception of a design1 21
around or improvement technology as an output.
Claims that interfere with the core of the public privilege to
understand disclosed knowledge and use it in creative cognition are
not as common as claims that interfere with the core of the public
privilege to disseminate disclosed knowledge, but they are still
feasible. With respect to understanding, the simplest, brute-force
approach would be with a method claim that recites the act of
118. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
119. Brean, It's No "Use," supra note 96, at 793-96; Dillon, supra note 96, at 444-47;
Holbrook & Osborne, supra note 96, at 1343-44. For a discussion of direct infringement by
electronic, 3D representations, see supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
120. The act of understanding disclosed knowledge can also be viewed as part of the public
privilege of dissemination: ensuring the free flow of texts is meaningless if readers do not have a
privilege to understand the knowledge that the texts represent.
121. See supra notes 38-48 and accompanying text. Design-arounds and improvements are
different. Someone who is inspired by a patented technology and conceives of a new technology
can make and use the new technology without the permission of the patent owner if the
technology is a design-around, but not if it is within the scope of the claims of the original patent
and thus an improvement. In the context of the inventive cognition that forms part of the public
privilege to use disclosed knowledge itself, however, this difference is irrelevant. In this context,
the focus is not on the use of the new technology but rather on the process of conceiving the new
technology. Inventive cognition should fall within the public privilege to use disclosed knowledge
itself even if it yields an improvement rather than a design-around.
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comprehending the disclosed knowledge. 122 So, for example, if a
researcher discovers that patients taking a particular drug who have
metabolite levels below a certain concentration are likely not receiving
the therapeutic benefit of a drug, 123 he could attempt to claim a
method of understanding that a metabolite level below that
concentration correlates with the drug being therapeutically
ineffective. With respect to creative cognition, however, it is more
difficult to formulate an effective claiming technique. The outputs of
the creative cognition are not known before the creative cognition
occurs, so drafting claims that describe the mental use of disclosed
knowledge to reach specific design-arounds or improvements is
impossible. In addition, claims generically claiming creative cognition
using the disclosed knowledge without reciting the output as a
limitation are almost certainly invalid for overbreadth. However,
because creative cognition necessarily uses the disclosed knowledge as
an input, the brute-force understanding claim discussed above also
encompasses the creative cognition involved in conceiving designarounds and improvements.
There has been surprisingly little case law addressing the
limits on the patentability of cognition in human minds over the last
several decades. The Supreme Court has repeatedly identified mental
processes as patent-ineligible subject matter under § 101,124 but it has
never directly addressed the mental-process exclusion by invalidating
or upholding a claim to a mental process while expressly presenting
the mental-process exclusion as its rationale. Nonetheless, given
current Federal Circuit law, it is safe to assume that § 101 is doing
most, if not all, of the work needed to safeguard the core of the public
125
privilege to use disclosed knowledge itself from cognition claims.
Raw claims to understanding disclosed knowledge-or, in fact, any
method claims reciting only cognitive-process limitations-are clear

122. A product claim to the brain state that supports the act of understanding is also
theoretically possible, but it is yet more farfetched as a practical matter.
123. Cf. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294-95
(2012) (addressing diagnostic claims premised on a similar newly discovered correlation).
124. Id. at 1293; Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
125. The Federal Circuit tends to enforce the patent-ineligibility of human cognition by
citing the abstract ideas exclusion. In re BRCAi- and BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test
Patent Litig., 774 F.3d 755, 763-65 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (describing the mental comparison of BRCA
sequences as a patent-ineligible abstract idea). The Federal Circuit frequently discusses the
exclusion of mental processes from patent eligibility in the context of software-executed
inventions. E.g., CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1371-73 (Fed. Cir.
2011). However, these cases do not implicate the patentability of human cognition. Rather, they
implicate the patentability of software-executed processes that could, in the alternative, be
performed by a human mind.
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cases of patent-ineligible subject matter under § 101 today. 126 Recent
developments at the Federal Circuit strongly suggest that claims to
combinations of mental steps and extramental steps (the latter of
which are often called "physical" or "tangible" steps) are not patent
eligible, either, at least if the limitations reciting the extramental
steps encompass the prior art, and the sole point of novelty thus
resides in the understanding steps. 127 In other words, these
developments suggest that a variant of the point of novelty or
patentable-weight approach to distinction over the prior art employed
in the printed matter doctrine now also applies to method claims
reciting understanding steps as well. 128 Thus, continuing the example
above, a claim to a two-step method of, first, determining the
metabolite level in a patient's blood and, second, understanding that,
in general, a metabolite level below that concentration correlates with
the drug's therapeutic inefficacy would likely be patent ineligible if the
step of determining the metabolite level were in the prior art because
the novel understanding step would not be given patentable weight.
From the perspective of enforcing inventors' disclosure
obligations, the use of the patentable-weight analysis in assessing the
patentability of claims reciting understanding steps is good policy. In
fact, it is more essential in the context of cognition claims than it is in
the context of printed matter claims. When printed matter claims are
at issue, the decision to make, use, or sell representations of printed
instructions is the result of a volitional act, so technology users can
opt not to use the instructions-and-prior-art combination and to use
only the prior art technology instead. 129 In contrast, basic cognitive

126. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 133435 (Fed. Cir. 2012), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). As was true with the core dissemination claims, there are
few litigated cases today involving core cognition claims. Applicants know that they will not
successfully obtain such claims, so they do not draft them in unambiguous terms in the first
place.
127. In re BRCA1, 774 F.3d at 763-65 (interpreting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1295-97 to require
this result). Before the Supreme Court's opinion in Mayo v. Prometheus, the Federal Circuit had
not reached this conclusion. Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347,
1358-59 (Fed. Cir. 2010), rev'd, 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
128. See supra notes 104-105 and accompanying text (discussing the patentable-weight
approach of the printed matter doctrine). When cognition claims are at issue, the patentableweight approach is today being administered as an "inventive concept" analysis. In re BRCA1,
774 F.3d at 759, 763-65. Yet, the effect of the inventive-concept analysis of patent eligibility on
cognition claims is roughly the same as the effect of the patentable-weight approach in the
printed matter doctrine on representation claims, at least in most cases. Kevin Emerson Collins,
Prometheus Laboratories, Mental Steps, and PrintedMatter, 50 HoUs. L. REV. 391, 402 (2012).
129. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (noting that potential infringers can opt to
use the prior art rather than a combination of the prior art and printed instructions).
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acts like understanding are nonvolitional. 130 Once someone has been
exposed to the disclosed knowledge, for example by reading a patent
specification, he cannot help but understand the disclosed knowledge.
If claims like the two-step determine-and-understand claim presented
above were valid, the public would have to avoid using prior art
technologies in order to be able to freely exercise its privilege to read,
understand, and think about the knowledge disclosed in a patent.
Forcing the public to elect to either use prior art technologies or
exercise their privilege to use disclosed knowledge itself deprives the
public of its end of the bargain under the quid pro quo of disclosures
for exclusive rights. 13' Therefore, invalidating determine-andunderstand claims is essential, and a patentable-weight approach to
the eligibility of understanding claims is the most effective way of
doing so.
Moving beyond core cases, a contestable issue at the periphery,,
of the public privilege to use disclosed knowledge itself in cognition
that has been repeatedly litigated over the last decade involves
medical diagnostic claims based on newly discovered correlations. In
fact, in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, the
Supreme Court addressed the patent eligibility of a diagnostic claim
based on the very correlation in the hypothetical claims considered
above-namely, a correlation between patients' metabolite levels
being below a certain level and patients' drug dosages likely being
therapeutically ineffective. 3 2 With some allowances for simplification,
the Mayo claim recited a two-step method of, first, determining the
metabolite level in a particular patient's blood using a prior art test
and, second, inferring that a metabolite level below a certain
concentration means that that particular patient's drug dosage is
ineffectively low.' 33 No actual modification of the patient's drug dosage
was required for infringement. The only important difference between
the two-step, hypothetical claim described above1 34 and the Mayo
claim resides entirely within the second, cognition step. In the
130. Kevin Emerson Collins, Constructive Nonvolition in Patent Law and the Problem of
Insufficient Thought Control, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 759, 794-96.
131. Id. at 806-12; see also Dmitry Karshtedt, Photocopies, Patents, and Knowledge
Transfer: The Uneasy Case of Justice Breyer's Patentable Subject Matter Jurisprudence, 69
VAND. L. REV. 1739, 1774-75 (2016).

132. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294-95. Mayo also involved a claim based on the related
correlation between patients' metabolite levels being above a different level and patents' drug
dosages being so high that the risk of toxicity-related side effects is significant. Id.
133. The claims before the Supreme Court also recited an initial step of administering the
drug to a patient. Id. at 1295.
134. See supra note 128 and accompanying text (presenting this hypothetical two-step
method claim).
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hypothetical, patent-ineligible claim, the cognition step encompasses a
doctor's mental act of understanding that the correlation exists in
patients' blood streams in general. In the actual Mayo claim, the
cognition step more narrowly encompasses an applied act of syllogistic
reasoning in which a doctor uses his knowledge of the general
correlation in a diagnostic inference that yields clinically useful
knowledge about her patient in particular. 135 In other words, the
litigated claim was not a determine-and-understand claim but rather
136
a determine-and-infer claim.
Whether the determine-and-infer claim actually at issue in
Mayo is a patent-ineligible claim to a mental process has not yet been
decided in the courts. Although the Supreme Court invalidated the
Mayo claim, it did not address the mental process issue. 137 Rather, the
question on which the Supreme Court accepted certiorari and on
which it focused in its opinion was whether the Mayo claim directed to
a patent-ineligible "law of nature" in the abstract. 138 One consequence
of paying attention to the structural implications of inventors'
disclosure obligations in a more rigorous manner is that the mentalprocess issue lurking just under the surface in the Mayo opinion, and
other opinions framing medical-diagnostic claims as claims that
implicate patent-ineligible laws of nature, comes to the surface. These
cases are no longer cases simply identifying the limits that nature
imposes on patent protection. They are rather cases identifying the
limits that human cognition imposes on patent protection due to
inventors' disclosure obligations. In turn, this refraining offers an
opportunity to both alter the limits on patent protection imposed in

135. Collins, supra note 4, at 1338-39.
136. The narrow nature of the claimed inference-addressing a particular level of a
particular metabolite of a particular drug in a particular patient-has made the Mayo claim less
controversial than other claims that encompass much broader swaths of reasoning. For an
example of a far more expansive and controversial determine-and-infer claim, see Classen
Immunotherapies v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011). However, the difference
between the Mayo and Classen claims is important only if the underlying normative problems
derive from claim breadth, as they do when overbreadth and preemption are the primary
concerns. When, as here, the underlying problem is private control over mental cognition
employing the knowledge disclosed in a patent, the differences between claims following the
Mayo and Classen templates are not important.
137. The Federal Circuit did address the mental process issue in the Mayo claims, but it did
so under § 101 doctrine that is now outdated because it failed to employ a patentable-weight, or
inventive-concept, approach. Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d
1347, 1358-59 (Fed. Cir. 2010), rev'd, 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
138. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297-98.
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these cases and tie those limits to the firmer policy mooring provided
139
by the public-knowledge theory of the disclosure.
Putting contemporary doctrine to one side, should the public
privilege to use disclosed knowledge itself include a privilege to
engage in the Mayo claim's diagnostic method? Should the shift from a
raw understanding step in a determine-and-understand claim to a
focused inference step in a determine-and-infer claim be enough of a
difference to impart patent-eligibility? On the one hand, a robust
conception of the public privilege would take Rosenberg's statement
that "anyone is free to think ... about what is covered by the patent
without trespassing upon the exclusive right of the patentee" seriously
and frame the Mayo claims as wily tricks with which inventors
attempt to privatize the very resource that their disclosure obligations
demand that they publicize. 140 Both understanding and inference
steps are purely mental activities, and perhaps the public privilege to.
use disclosed knowledge itself prior to patent expiration includes all
acts of logical, human reasoning that employ the disclosed knowledge
as an input, even if those mental acts are performed in conjunction
with prior art technology. On the other hand, a more tailored
conception of the public privilege would only embrace the core acts of
understanding disclosed knowledge and conceiving creative designarounds and improvements. Under this parsimonious conception of
the privilege, claims to novel acts of diagnostic reasoning do not allow
inventors to escape their disclosure obligations. The public can read a
patent disclosing a newly discovered correlation, think about that
correlation, speculate about why the correlation exists, posit new
hypotheses about how metabolic processes work, and design new
experiments to test those hypotheses, all without infringing a
determine-and-infer claim like the Mayo claim.14 1 Some way of dealing
139. Rather than switching from a nature-based limit on patent protection to a mind-based
limit, another possibility is to layer the proposed mind-based limit on top of the existing naturebased limit that structures the Supreme Court's reasoning in its Mayo opinion. The infirmities of
the nature-based reasoning, however, weigh in favor of switching rather than layering. See
Collins, supra note 4, at 1335-37 (illustrating the problems that follow from taking Mayo's
analysis of patent-ineligible "law of nature" at face value).
140. ROSENBERG, supra note 43, at 10.
141. In theory, even a single-step claim to just the inference step, without the extramental
determining step, would be permissible under this narrower conception of the public privilege to
use disclosed knowledge itself. Nonetheless, such a single-step inference claim would be patentineligible under the contemporary mental-process exclusion because it recites a purely mental
process. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (arguing that claims to understanding
disclosed knowledge as are clearly patent-ineligible). Today's mental-process exclusion is thus
doing more than protecting a thin implementation of the public privilege to use disclosed
knowledge itself. It may be partially protecting a thicker implementation of the privilege,
extending the privilege to encompass all human cognition enabled by disclosed knowledge, not
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with the nonvolition problem is still required for claims in the mold of
the Mayo claims to coexist with the public privilege even in its
narrower form, 142 but this can be accomplished through means less
drastic than invalidating all claims that follow the template of the
143
Mayo claims.
CONCLUSION

Public-knowledge disclosure theory usually focuses exclusively
on the benefits of the publicly available knowledge that an inventor is
obligated to disclose, and it overlooks structural implications of
inventors' disclosure obligations for the reach of patentees' rights. If
patents are to ensure a public privilege to use disclosed knowledge
itself during the term of a patent, there must be corresponding
restrictions on patentees' rights that prohibit private control over the
very activities that constitute the public privilege. The Patent Act's
provisions that establish the permissible reach of patentees' rights
must be interpreted in a structural manner in light of § 112(a), and
the duality of claiming and disclosing that forms the deep structure of
the Patent Act, in order to safeguard the public privilege.
There are two principal consequences of openly recognizing the
structural implications of inventors' disclosure obligations. First, in
many core cases, contemporary patent doctrine already enforces the
needed limits on patentees' rights. Here, recognition improves the
conceptual coherence of patent law and removes the risk that
important limitations on patentees' rights will be abandoned or
interpreted narrowly due to doctrinal chaos or a lack of statutory
grounding. Second, in cases at the periphery of the privilege,
acknowledging the structural implications of inventors' disclosure
obligations may impact patent law's public/private balance by
highlighting the cost of allowing patent protection to reach further
into the acts of knowledge dissemination and creative cognition that
employ the knowledge as an input.

simply the creative cognition required for conceiving design-arounds and improvements. Or, it
may be implementing a normative justification other than enforcement of inventors' disclosure
obligations. Kevin Emerson Collins, Patent-Ineligibilityas Counteraction, 94 WASH U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 18-44), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=
2748288 [https://perma.cc/R4SW-5M3H].
142. See supranotes 130-131 and accompanying text.
143. Collins, supra note 130, at 774-90 (laying out a constructive non-volition defense to
patent infringement); Karshtedt, supra note 131, at 1783-84 (same).

